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In this paper, we analyze the influence of the state on the improvement of corporate gov-
ernance in Russia of the early 2000s. Taking into account the low quality of market institu-
tions in the 1990s (i.e., the market failure phenomenon), we assume that state intervention 
as the “second best” institution had a positive impact in this case. Using a dataset of 822 
joint-stock companies, we tested this hypothesis in two types of corporate models – state-
owned or mixed firms and “politically connected” firms. The first model confirmed a 
strong positive influence of state ownership on the corporate governance in Russia in 
2001-2004. The estimation results of this model are statistically robust in different specifi-
cations. We connect this result with attempts of the Russian government to use standard 
mechanisms and procedures of corporate governance to defend its property rights in its re-
lations with state-owned and mixed enterprises. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa käsitellään valtion vaikutusta yritysten hallintajärjestelmien kehitty-
miseen Venäjällä 2000-luvun alkuvuosina. Ottaen huomioon markkinatalouden insti-
tuutioiden toiminnan heikon tason 1990-luvulla työssä oletetaan, että valtion väliintulo on 
parantanut yritysten toimintaa. Tutkimuksessa testataan tätä oletusta 822 osakeyhtiön 
aineistolla. Tutkittavana on kahdenlaisia yritysmalleja: valtion omistamia sekä sekaomis-
tuksessa olevia ja poliittisesti vaikutusvaltaisia yrityksiä. Ensimmäisen mallin tulokset 
osoittavat, että valtion omistus paransi selvästi yritysten hallintajärjestelmiä Venäjällä vu-
osina 2001–2004. Tulokset eivät riipu empiirisen mallin spesifikaatiosta. Tämä tulos on 
yhteydessä Venäjän hallituksen pyrkimyksiin käyttää normaaleja toimintamalleja yritysten 
hallintajärjestelmissä omien etujen suojelemiseksi valtion omistamissa yrityksissä ja sel-
laisissa yrityksissä, joissa omistajina ovat sekä valtio että yksityiset yritykset. 
 
Asiasanat: yritysten hallintajärjestelmät, markkinatalouden instituutiot, valtion omistamat 
yritykset, Venäjä 
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1  Introduction  
 
The corporate behavior of Russian firms has changed drastically in the last decade. In the 
beginning of this period, many experts reported the failure of institutional reforms (Stiglitz, 
1999), and many empirical studies confirmed this viewpoint. Therefore, a detailed study by 
Brown et al. (2006) based on data from 24,000 enterprises over the 1992-2002 period es-
tablished that, while the Ukraine, Romania, and Hungary enjoyed increases in productivity, 
on the average, within a year of privatization, the effect of privatization in Russia was in-
determinate even after five years. Russian companies systematically treated foreign inves-
tors with hostility and grossly violated shareholders’ rights, and the Russian government 
could not protect abused investors and shareholders by law (Kraakman et al., 2000). In 
comparison with Central and Eastern Europe, the inhabitants of Russia were more critical 
of the outcome of privatization and were widely supportive of the revision of its results 
(Denisova et al., 2007). The negative experience in Russia led to new conclusions about 
the importance of the institutional environment and the inefficiency of privatization under 
a weak government exposed to group interests (Perotti, 2004). 
Contrary to this very poor starting point, two parallel trends became apparent in 
Russia during the 2000s: corporate governance obviously improved, and the government 
gained strength and significantly increased its presence in the economy. The first trend was 
expressed in terms of a broad introduction of international accounting standards, in the ini-
tial public offering (IPO) of Russian companies on international stock exchanges, and in 
the more widespread practice of invitation of independent directors to the boards (Puffer & 
McCarthy, 2003; Yakovlev, 2004). This was followed by substantial growth in capitaliza-
tion of the Russian stock market and, since 2006, by a strong inflow of foreign investment. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as mixed enterprises played important 
roles in this process. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the government streamlined the ac-
tivities of SOEs as well as made general improvements in the institutions of corporate gov-
ernance. In particular, a new version of the joint-stock company law was passed, the bank-
ruptcy law was revised, a code of corporate behavior was designed, the dissemination of 
best practices of corporate governance was promoted, a reform of the judicial system was 
launched, and the system of law enforcement was upgraded. At the same time, the moni-
toring of SOE performance was introduced, the corporatization of federal state enterprises 
(FGUP) accelerated, standard instructions for state representatives in SOE boards with Andrei Yakovlev 
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government stakes were developed, competitive procedures for the appointment of SOE 
managers were introduced, and contracts with them were formalized (HSE, 2003).  In the 
course of upgrading corporate governance in the public sector, the government launched 
IPOs of large state-owned companies in order to increase their capitalization and to obtain 
financial market appraisals of their performance. As a result, two leading Russian state-
controlled banks, Sberbank and VTB-Bank, as well as the state-owned Rosneft Oil Com-
pany, acquired the main assets of Yukos Company had large IPOs in 2006-2007 and man-
aged to raise more than $27 billion in the market.  
The second trend had different dimensions as well. On the one hand, macroeco-
nomic and monetary policies significantly improved. The Russian government secured a 
budget surplus for a long time, which could reduce inflation by up to 10% per annum and 
accumulate a large amount of international currency reserves. As a consequence, Alexei 
Kudrin was recognized in March 2005 by the international business-magazine,  The 
Banker, as the Finance Minister of The Year.  
On the other hand, strengthening of the Russian state was expressed in the direct 
and indirect nationalization of a number of large companies either by filing tax claims 
against them or by the government or an SOE acquiring controlling stakes in private com-
panies (see OECD (2006, Section 1) for the entire economy and Vernikov (2007) for the 
banking sector). At the same time, the government was keen on exerting informal pressure 
on business enterprises. In addition to the Yukos affair in 2003-2004, which is discussed in 
detail by Yakovlev (2006), the Russian government conducted a sort of corporate takeover 
in the cases of the Russneft Oil Company in 2006-2007 and the conflict surrounding the 
TNK-BP in the spring of 2008. 
The years 2006-2007 were also marked by the establishment of state corporations, 
which were endowed with several billion dollars from the federal budget and acquired a 
number of private and mixed companies (the first case is that of the former FGUP “Ro-
soboronexport,” which was reorganized in November 2007 into the state corporation 
“Rostechnologii”). In July 2008, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin charged one of Russia’s 
leading mining and metals companies, Mechel, with tax evasion via transfer pricing. This 
led to a 40% decrease in company market capitalization on the NYSE and was considered 
by some observers as a reiteration of the Yukos affair (Shokhina & Shevtsova, 2008). 
These contradictory trends raise the question of whether or not the connection to 
the state has a statistically significant impact on the quality of corporate governance in the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




firms concerned. In this paper, we are going to answer this question by relying on the re-
sults of a survey of 822 joint-stock companies, which was conducted by the SU-HSE and 
the Hitotsubashi University in 2005.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a short descrip-
tion of relevant studies and a formulation of a testable hypothesis. Section 3 describes the 
data. Section 4 outlines the methodology. Section 5 contains empirical results and discus-
sion. Section 6 presents the main findings and the conclusion.  
 
 
2   Literature review and testable hypothesis 
 
Government intervention in the economy by the establishment of SOEs has been generally 
met with criticism in the mainstream economic literature. Based on a review of empirical 
studies, Megginson & Netter (2001) concluded that SOEs, as a rule, are inferior to private 
firms in terms of efficiency. As noted by Perotti (2004), this is related to a lack of suffi-
cient accountability of SOEs or to “soft budget constraints,” as termed by Janos Kornai. In 
effect, SOE managers and employees lose incentives to upgrade their efficiency. SOEs are 
used for political objectives, and the responsible government agencies become more and 
more corrupt. In addition, even disregarding the corruption, the inefficiency of an SOE can 
arise from a conflict between public interests and the interests of state officials who, fol-
lowing the standard bureaucratic logic, try to maximize the budgets under their control 
rather than to improve efficiency. SOEs may also restrict the activities of private firms and, 
therefore, undermine competitive environment (Vining & Boardman, 1992). 
Logically responding to such a skeptical view of SOEs by economists, govern-
ments focused on the improvement of enterprise efficiency and economic performance in 
general by means of privatization policy. According to the estimates cited by Megginson & 
Netter (2001), the SOE share of the “global GDP” declined from more than 10 percent in 
1979 to six percent by 1996. 
To a great extent, this was a result of mass privatization in former socialist coun-
tries. However, the experience of economies in transition in this context is far from unam-
biguous (Nellis, 1999). In Central and Eastern Europe, privatization has usually improved 
the performance of firms (Pohl et al., 1997). However, Poland in the early 1990s and espe-
cially China in the 1980s and early 1990s gave empirical evidence that SOEs can perform Andrei Yakovlev 
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much better without any privatization. Pinto et al. (1993) and Li (1997) explained this ef-
fect by the results of such measures as toughening of budget constraints and bank lending 
policies, stronger competition of imports, and introduction of a system of incentives for 
SOE managers. Explaining similar results for Singapore public companies in 1990-2000, 
Ang & Ding (2006) noted that, when the venture capital industry is not yet developed and 
institutional investors have not reached the critical threshold of share ownership, the gov-
ernment can lead in providing risk capital and may serve as a large monitoring shareholder.  
In another institutional context of the developed US economy, Kwoka (2005) 
shows that public enterprises may be superior when output has important non-specifiable 
attributes. Private providers in this case will have incentives to undersupply this hard speci-
fiable quality. Public enterprises, by contrast, may have weaker overall incentives and, 
hence, higher costs, but those incentives do not favor price over quality. Summarizing the 
general discussion about comparative efficiency of state-owned, mixed, and private firms, 
Kwoka (2005) concludes that even careful control for external factors has not eliminated 
divergent findings and there is a space for new empirical research.    
Privatization in transition economies and the developing world clearly showed 
another problem, namely, that one firm could be private but, under conditions of a weak 
and corrupted state, it could extract rents from close relatives of the government at the ex-
pense of society and other private firms. (Note: The term “close relatives of the govern-
ment” is not clear. Do you mean, “…companies connected to the government”?  Please 
check and change as appropriate.) Hence, Hellman et al. (2000), using the World Bank and 
an EBRD firm-level survey on obstacles in the business environment, defined state capture 
as one of two key corrupt strategies of interaction between a firm and the state in transition 
countries.  
Following this line of analysis, a number of researchers studied more broadly the 
phenomenon of “politically connected firms,” in which top officials or politicians act as 
shareholders or members of the board or good friends of main owners (Faccio, 2006). Ana-
lyzing a very large sample of 16,000 public companies in 47 countries for 1997, Mara Fac-
cio concludes that, even though political connections provide significant benefits, con-
nected firms under-perform their peers on an ex-ante basis. Recent relevant studies for 
France (Bertrand et al., 2006) and China (Choi & Thum, 2007) support these findings. 
Thus, most of the previous theoretical research stresses the efficiency advantage 
of private enterprise, comparing it to public or “politically connected” firms. However, the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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results of empirical studies are not so unambiguous, especially in the case of privatization 
in transition countries. This effect is usually explained by the weakness of government in-
stitutions in a transition environment. Therefore, on the basis of detailed analysis of devel-
opment in the former socialist countries in 1980-1990, Grzegorz Kolodko, a well-known 
Polish economist and a key government official in Poland in 1994-1997, concludes that the 
depth of the “transitional” crisis and further economic development was conditioned by the 
retention of capable institutions in some countries and the catastrophic incapability of the 
government in others (Kolodko, 2000). If such institutions are inherited from a preceding 
regime, such as in China, they can be supportive of economic development.  
Therefore, we can assume that, under the conditions of the Russian economy of 
the early 2000s, the improvement of state capacities could have a positive influence on the 
quality of market institutions, including corporate governance. This hypothesis corre-
sponds to the arguments of Ang & Ding (2006) on the higher efficiency of Singapore pub-
lic companies in 1990-2000 and to the broader approach of “second best institutions” pro-
posed by Rodrik (2008).  The hypothesis about the positive influence of the state on formal 
indicators of corporate governance in state-owned and mixed enterprises was formulated in 
some policy advice and analytical papers (Avdasheva et al., 2007; NCCG, 2008, pp.132-




3  Questionnaire and data 
 
As stated in Dolgopyatova & Iwasaki (2006) the basic purpose of our enterprise survey 
was to understand the evolutionary processes of ownership relations and the governance 
mechanism of Russian corporations with an underdeveloped market economy and incom-
plete social and economic institutions. Our questionnaire included about 150 questions 
about the influence of shareholders and managers on decision-making process in compa-
nies, the scale, progress and effects of business integration processes, relations between the 
business sector and the state and other issues.  
Our enterprise survey was conducted in the first half of 2005. Local branches of 
the Levada Center sent interviewers to a total of 859 companies, among which 822 firms 
gave valid answers. The focus of survey was on the industrial and communications (except Andrei Yakovlev 
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for postal services) sectors. This is because, in these two sectors, joint-stock companies 
account for the largest share of sales and because most of the corporations that have issued 
stocks or bonds in the capital market belong to these two sectors. The surveyed firms were 
selected from among joint-stock companies with more than 100 employees. This criterion 
was set to exclude small businesses, for which the issue of corporate governance is largely 
a secondary matter. 
The samples were selected by the method of stratified sampling. The surveyed 
firms were randomly selected from sampling books of industrial and communications 
companies by taking into account three attributes: the sector they belonged to; their scale 
(total number of employees); and their form of incorporation (open or closed joint-stock 
company). The proportion of surveyed firms in the various parts of Russia and the relative 
proportion of independent firms and member firms of business groups are a consequence 
of the random sampling. As there were only about 160 Russian companies in the surveyed 
sectors that had issued stocks or bonds in domestic or foreign securities markets, we asked 
the executives of all of these companies to answer our questionnaire and interviewed all 
who agreed to our request. 
The questionnaires were answered by 277 CEO (33.7%), 85 first deputy CEO 
(10.3%), 417 deputy CEO (50.7%) in charge of economy, finance, sales, or corporate gov-
ernance, 13 chairpersons of the board of directors (1.6%), and 30 heads of corporate gov-
ernance departments (3.6%). The average length of service of the respondents was 13.5 
years (median: 9), and that of service in their current position was 6.2 years (median: 4). 
The 822 firms surveyed were situated in 64 regions of the 89 constituent entities 
of the Russian Federation. Classified into federal districts, 265 companies (32.2%) were 
located in the Central Federal District, 97 firms (11.8%) in the Northwest Federal District, 
71 (8.6%) in the South Federal District, 197 (24.0%) in the Privolzhsky (Volga) Federal 
District, 83 (10.1%) in the Ural Federal District, 85 (10.3%) in the Siberian Federal Dis-
trict, and 24 (2.9%) in the Far East Federal District. Regional proportion of the samples of 
this survey was very close to that of the actual proportional distribution of Russian compa-
nies, except for the fact that the number of surveyed firms based in the Privolzhsky (Volga) 
Federal District was relatively higher. 
Table 1 shows the proportional composition of the surveyed firms according to 
their sector and business category. Industrial companies accounted for 91.4% (751 firms) 
of all the samples, and communications businesses made up the rest, 8.6% (71 firms). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




Among the industrial companies, 255 machinery and metal working businesses made up 
the largest share (31%), followed by 169 food industry companies, which accounted for 
20.6%. The proportional shares for the other six sectors ranged from 4.0% to 9.5%.  
According to the responses to the questionnaires, the average number of workers 
of the surveyed firms was 1,884 (standard deviation: 5,570; median: 465). Table 2 shows 
the proportional composition of the surveyed firms according to the number of workers for 
both the industrial and communications businesses. We have estimated that, according to 
official statistics, the average number of workers per company in the industrial and com-
munications sectors was 31.4 and 49.6, respectively, as of 2004. This clearly shows that 
the average scale of the surveyed firms is much larger than that of most Russian companies 
in the two sectors. The 822 surveyed firms employed a total of 1,549,008 people. This 
represents 10.3% of a total of 15 Mio workers, which is the estimated total of those who 
were employed in the year 2004 by the industrial and communications sectors.  
Respondents were also asked to provide a figure for the total sales for their com-
panies in 2004. The results showed that the average total sales of 720 companies that gave 
valid answers were 3890 Mio rubles (standard deviation: 34092 Mio; median: 200 Mio). 
The figure for the total sales of all the 720 companies that gave valid answers amounted to 
2,800 billion rubles. It represents 23.9% of the 2004 total sales for the industrial and com-
munications sectors. 
Classified into the types of organizations (forms of incorporation) 553 samples 
(67.3%) were open joint-stock companies (OAO), and 269 firms (32.7%) were closed 
joint-stock companies (ZAO), including workers' joint-stock companies (people's enter-
prises), which are a special type of closed joint-stock company.  
The majority of firms surveyed (570 companies or 69.3%), were founded through 
the privatization process that started after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 124 firms 
(15.1%) were newly formed in and after 1992, 79 businesses (9.6%) were newly estab-
lished by a division divested from another privatized or state-owned firm, and 24 enter-
prises (2.9%) were established by firms that had merged. 
499 corporations (60.7%) were “independent firms” that had no ownership rela-
tionship with any business group, and the rest, 323 enterprises (39.3%), were “member 
firms of business groups.” Among the latter firms, 278 companies (33.8%) were so-called 
“affiliated enterprises,” and 44 (5.4%) were “core enterprises of their business groups.”  Andrei Yakovlev 
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Other details on the composition of the samples as well as full version of our 
questionnaire in Russian and English can be found in Dolgopyatova & Iwasaki (2006).   
 
 
4  Methodology 
 
To test if our hypothesis regarding the connection of a firm to the government can be posi-
tive for the quality of corporate governance in the Russian situation of the early 2000s, we 
used a set of ordinary probit regressions. For the dependent variable, we took the 
CG_INDEX, the integral indicator of the quality of corporate governance, which was built 
on the basis of a number of variables directly or indirectly describing relationships between 
joint-stock companies and their shareholders, first of all, minority ones. 
In this aspect, our approach differs from that of most previous studies, which re-
lied on various financial indicators of enterprise performance as dependent variables (Li, 
1997; Tian & Estrin, 2008). The explanation for our choice is that Russia has developed a 
very high concentration of ownership and control under a narrow equity market and imper-
fect institutions of corporate governance. In this situation, if a company is showing strong 
financial performance, this by no means implies that minority shareholders of the company 
will actually be able to receive a share of the “corporate pie” that they are formally due. 
In the case of Russia in the 2000s, the improvement of financial performance in-
dicators can be explained in the short-term period by the influence of external factors, such 
as the devaluation of rubles for domestically oriented firms or an increase of world market 
prices for exporters of raw materials. Under such contextual changes, the quality of corpo-
rate governance (considered as a system of incentives) can be more important for investors 
and minority shareholders. Indeed, good corporate governance is quite costly for firms, and 
return on such types of “investment” can be expected only from a mid-term perspective. 
Therefore, CG improvement on the firm level can be a signal of real changes in a firm’s 
strategies. 
There are also some differences between our approach and that in relevant studies 
of corporate governance. Traditionally, such studies used a variety of ratings for the as-
sessment of the quality of corporate governance. For instance, Doidge et al. (2007) in-
cluded in their analysis the data of S&P transparency and disclosure rating, based on the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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information disclosed by the companies, and the FTSE/ISS scorecard, based on evaluations 
of financial analysts.  
However, such ratings and scorecards are generally applicable to public compa-
nies that are traded on stock exchanges and disclose considerable volumes of information 
about their business. For current Russia, this is a very restrictive approach because only a 
small number of joint-stock companies can meet such criteria of the stock market. For ex-
ample, in 2007 Standard & Poors rated informational transparency in only 80 companies in 
Russia (S&P, 2007). However, there are about 170,000 joint-stock companies in Russia, 
and most of them have minority shareholders. Our sample consists of such joint-stock 
companies to a large degree, and we tried to detect how their relationships with sharehold-
ers are changing. 
To this effect, using a number of questions about the corporate behavior of firms 
surveyed in our questionnaire, we constructed the CG_Index for our sample , which cov-
ered listed and non-listed companies. The list of these 13 questions and the answers of our 
respondents are shown in Table 3. By interpreting the answers in terms of better / worse 
corporate behavior, we followed conventional principles of corporate governance (OECD, 
2004). The distribution of companies depending on this new variable CG_Index is shown 
in Table 4. To avoid overestimating the quality of corporate governance due to the interre-
lation between some variables, we divided the sample firms into 5 categories (i.e., 20, 40, 
60, and 80 percentiles) depending on the total initial score of the CG_Index and created a 
transformed CG_Index that ranges from 1 (firms with the lowest CG quality) to 5 (firms 
with the highest CG quality). 
To measure the influence that the government can possibly exert on the quality of 
corporate performance in the surveyed joint-stock companies, we used two variables. First, 
our questionnaire provided information about government shares in the capital of the sur-
veyed firms. This enabled us to form the STATE_OWNER variable, dividing our sample 
into 3 subcategories: state-controlled firms, firms with the minority stake held by the gov-
ernment, and private firms. There were about 20% of firms with a governmental stake in 
our sample (Table 5).  
Secondly, we had data on different forms of support that enterprises obtained 
from the government as well as on other formal and informal relationships between the 
government and the enterprises in question. Relying on this questionnaire data, we built a 
variable expressing the proximity of enterprises to the government POLIT_CONNECT Andrei Yakovlev 
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(from this viewpoint, our approach is close to that of Faccio (2006) and other studies of 
“politically connected firms”). Table 6 includes nine questions on relationships with the 
government and obtained state support, and Table 7 presents the distribution of firms de-
pending on their score on this new variable. To avoid the overestimation of political con-
nection, we divided the sample in the 3 categories depending on the total score of the 
Polit_Connect Index.  
Both variables are highly correlated with our dependent variable CG_Index (Ta-
ble 8). There is also a high correlation between State_Owner and POLIT_CONNECT 
(Pearson Chi-Square, p<0,000), but approximately 18% of private firms have a high level 
of political connection, and 12% of state controlled firms obtain only a low level of politi-
cal connection.  
In our regression analysis, we have included a number of control variables. To 
take the size factor into consideration, we used a logarithm of employment. Taking into 
account that the survey covered 64 regions, we used a REGION variable in order to test the 
possible influence of this factor. This variable was formed depending on the level of eco-
nomic development of Russian regions according to the classification of the Ministry for 
Economic Development and Trade in 2004. 
To monitor differentials by industry, we used a standard SECTOR variable. At the 
same time, the goals of our study required consideration of the scope of the possible influ-
ence of the government on corporate behavior. Therefore, in some modifications of our 
basic model, we also used a SECTOR_reg dummy, which designated the affiliation of the 
surveyed enterprises to the regulated and non-regulated industrial sectors. 
In addition, we also used a number of other independent variables that could af-
fect the relationships of the surveyed joint-stock companies with their shareholders and our 
aggregate indicator of quality of corporate governance.  
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical 
analysis.  
General assessment of the financial condition of a firm - FINANCE. We recog-
nized that the issue of dividend payment, which was significant in the formation of the 
CG_Index, depended, among other things, on the financial condition of a firm. Conse-
quently, we could expect that the connection between these variables was positive. 
Presence of a controlling stake in a company in the hands of a single shareholder 
or a united group of shareholders – DOMINANT_OWNER. A number of previous studies BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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(Dolgopyatova, 2003; Guriev et al., 2004; Yakovlev, 2004) allowed understanding that, 
under the Russian conditions, concentration of ownership rights could have a positive in-
fluence on the quality of corporate governance. In particular, in a case in which the shares 
were diffused among several owners, even relatively large shareholders that kept the enter-
prise under control at the given moment may have had no motivation to pursue its devel-
opment in the long range because such a large shareholder had no guarantee that his posi-
tion in the firm would remain unchanged in the future. This uncertainty about future own-
ership rights may give incentives for the withdrawal of assets and for other measures that 
violate the rights of other shareholders. This is still truer for the behavior of managers, and 
shareholders have no effective tools to stop this opportunistic behavior under the disper-
sion of ownership and weak judicial institutions. A tendency toward the concentration of 
ownership and control was a logical outcome of such problems. The Russian experience 
demonstrated that, after acquiring a controlling stake, a dominant shareholder got incen-
tives to restructure and develop the company business and found real means to be in com-
mand of its managerial team as well.  
However, at the same time, dominant shareholders can obtain benefits from the 
direct control of cash flow and, therefore, are not likely to be very interested in the im-
provement of corporate governance. As a result, it is possible that there is a negative rela-
tionship between the presence of a controlling shareholder or a group of controlling share-
holders and the quality of corporate governance.  
Membership of a firm in a business group – BUSINESS_GROUPS. The firms 
that are members of holding company groups, which are approximately 40% of our re-
spondents, can expect to get financial support of their projects from their parent company. 
Therefore, they can be less dependent on outside financing and can have fewer incentives 
to consider the interests of small minority shareholders. At the same time, parent compa-
nies can more actively use the mechanisms of corporate governance for the supervision of 
their subsidiaries. 
Presence of foreign shareholders – FOREIGN_STOCK. Foreign investors are 
usually better informed about their rights and defend their ownership more actively. There-
fore, their presence among shareholders can have a positive influence on the quality of 
corporate governance. 
Presence of top managers experienced in foreign companies in Russia or abroad – 
FOREIGN_EXP. To be proficient in using the mechanisms of corporate governance, the Andrei Yakovlev 
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managers must have certain expertise and skills. Multinational corporations usually have a 
higher level of corporate governance. For this reason, we believed that the presence of top 
managers experienced in multinational corporations in the respondent firms could help dis-
seminate the best practice of corporate governance. 
 
 
5  Empirical results 
 
The results of a test of our hypothesis indicate that, under the current conditions in Russia, 
formal connections of firms to the state via participation of the government in the capital 
can have a positive influence on the quality of corporate governance in these firms. These 
results are described in Table 10. 
Model 1.0 (with control for the effects of size and industrial and regional affilia-
tion only) supports this hypothesis for firms with a minority stake held by government. For 
firms controlled by the state, the coefficient in regression is positive but not significant. 
Models 1.1-1.3 were used to evaluate the robustness of our results. In model 1.1, 
we added to the regression a broader number of control variables, which, in our opinion, 
could affect the quality of corporate governance: the affiliation of a firm to a business 
group; a controlling stake being in the hands of a single shareholder; the financial condi-
tions of the firm; the presence of foreign shareholders; and the previous job experience of 
top-managers of surveyed firms in foreign companies in Russia and abroad.  
The insertion of these variables improved the general parameters of our model 
(McFadden pseudo-R-square rose from 0.114 to 0.140). Both coefficients at the 
STATE_OWNER variable are significant in this model, but, for a state-controlled firm, the 
level is limited to 10%. As in model 1.0, the size of the enterprise has significant positive 
impact on the quality of corporate governance. The manner in which the size affects the 
quality can be easily explained because the costs of good corporate governance, in general, 
are comparable for companies that vary in size, but large companies can have substantially 
higher gains, in terms of the lower cost of external financing, than smaller ones. Therefore, 
large companies will have many more incentives for the introduction of good corporate 
governance. The general financial conditions, affiliation of a firm with a business group, 
and presence of foreigners among shareholders also exerted a positive influence on corpo-
rate governance. These results are in correspondence with our initial assumptions for con-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




trol variables. For the DOMINANT_OWNER and FOREIGN_EXP variables, the results 
are not significant. 
In model 1.2, instead of the SECTOR variable, we introduced the SECTOR_reg 
variable, which reflects the presence of governmental regulation of entry and tariffs in the 
industry. The coefficients at the STATE_OWNER variable remain significant in this 
model as well, but, for firms with government minority shareholding, they are at a lower 
level (p < 0,05). At the same time, this model provides additional evidence that the state 
can affect the quality of corporate governance not just in its capacity as a proprietor. In 
particular, firms in regulated industries show, to a great extent, better quality of corporate 
governance (p < 0.01).  
Finally, in model 1.3, we regress the sample without all firms listed at foreign 
stock exchanges. According to our interviews with practitioners in the Russian corporate 
sector, there were very strong differences between firms listed in New York or London and 
those on the Russian stock exchanges. The international standards for listing in New York 
and London are much higher than they are for listing in Russia. Therefore, we decided to 
test our hypothesis only for domestically traded and non-listed firms. However, as shown 
in Table 10, the results in general remain the same.          
Model 2.0 tests our hypothesis that indirect (informal) links to the government 
measured by the POLIT_CONNECT variable can be positive for the improvement of cor-
porate governance. We used four specifications of this model: 
only with the standard control variables SIZE, SECTOR, and REGION (model 
2.0); 
with broader number of control variables, including FINANCE, BUSI-
NESS_GROUPS, DOMIMANT_OWNER, FOREIGN_STOCK, and FOREIGN_EXP 
(model 2.1);  
with the SECTOR_reg variable instead of the SECTOR variable (model 2.2); 
with the elimination of all state-controlled and mixed firms from the sample 
(model 2.3). 
As can be seen from Table 11 in all cases, the coefficients at the 
POLIT_CONNECT variable were not significant. All other results concerning control 
variables were the same as in model 1. The SIZE, SECTOR_reg, FINANCE, BUSI-
NESS_GROUPS, and FOREIGN_STOCK variables exerted a positive influence on corpo-Andrei Yakovlev 
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rate governance. The impact of the DOMINANT_OWNER and FOREIGN_EXP variables 
was not significant. 
Therefore, our analysis gives us grounds to assert that, in Russia, in the period of 
2001-2004, direct connections of a company with the state via participation of the govern-
ment in the capital as well as affiliation of the company with regulated industrial sectors 
have a positive influence on the quality of corporate governance in these firms.  Other “po-
litical connections” of firms with the government were not significant for the improvement 
of corporate governance.  
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we evaluated the influence of the state on changes in the quality of corporate 
governance in Russia of the early 2000s using a database of 822 joint-stock companies. 
Due to the quality of our questionnaire, which included a wide range of questions related to 
the interaction between enterprises and authorities, we were able to assess the influence of 
the state regarding the practice of corporate governance in different ways, from the most 
rigorous, when the government acted as a shareholder, to milder ones, when various types 
of support and stimulation were used with the firms.  
Our regression analysis has showed that the formal indicators of the quality of 
corporate governance in Russia of the early 2000s were higher in companies under state 
control or with a stake held by the government and in companies from regulated industries. 
The quality of corporate governance differed significantly by enterprise size. In addition, a 
number of other factors were important for the improvement of corporate governance, in-
cluding good financial conditions, the presence of foreign shareholders, and affiliation of a 
firm with a business group. The political connections of firms as well as the presence of a 
dominant owner and the previous job experience of top-managers of surveyed firms in for-
eign companies in Russia and abroad did not have any significant influence on the quality 
of corporate governance. This result proved to be robust in different specifications of our 
basic model. 
This conclusion is inconsistent with the conventional attitude towards the role of 
the state, as described in economic literature, and particularly on the role of SOEs (Meg-
ginson & Netter, 2001; Perotti, 2004) and the role of political connections (Faccio, 2006). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




Even recent studies on China, which Russia is coming closer to in terms of models of in-
teraction between firms and the state, show that government stakes in corporations and/or 
other ways of influence have negative effects on enterprise performance (Nee et al., 2007; 
Choi & Thum, 2007; Tian & Estrin, 2008).  
However, in our opinion, what is to be considered here is the stage of develop-
ment of a concrete economy in a concrete point of time. In the 1990s, not only private 
shareholders but also the Russian government as an owner suffered from management 
abuses. The early 2000s in Russia were a time when some sort of proper order was intro-
duced after the disorganization and chaos of the preceding decade. This holds true, above 
all, for the relationship of the government with the SOEs, which were put back under con-
trol with a strong reliance on the procedures of corporate governance. In particular, the 
government introduced monitoring of the SOE performance, which required that top-
managers be accountable to the shareholders and members of the board of directors; fur-
thermore, joint-stock companies with stakes held by the government were required to pay 
dividends. In a sense, we can assert that the state as a proprietor used standard mechanisms 
and procedures of corporate governance for the defense of its interests. The government 
used the regulation of entry and tariffs as an additional channel of influence on the behav-
ior of enterprises, including the improvement of corporate governance.  
It is noteworthy that the positive impact of governmental interventions was more 
significant in the case of minority shareholding of government and less so in state-
controlled firms. This difference can be well explained from the viewpoint of conventional 
theory. Minority shareholding allows the government to propose standard objectives, such 
as an increase in profitability or capitalization. The participation of the government, in this 
case, as a shareholder, results in an increase in the informational transparency and account-
ability of management. However, in state-controlled firms, the government as the dominant 
owner can accomplish very different tasks. Therefore, its activity will have a lower impact 
on the improvement of corporate governance. 
The fact that these positive changes took place after a period of chaos and uncer-
tainty in the 1990s allows us to draw a parallel between Russia and the China of the 1980s 
rather than contemporary China. It is noteworthy that empirical studies based on the data 
of that time provide evidence of improvement in the performance of SOEs (Li, 1997).  
However, we emphasize that our conclusions about the positive influence of the 
state on the quality of corporate governance refer exclusively to the period of 2001-2004 Andrei Yakovlev 
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and cannot be extrapolated further. In this context, another comparison is interesting, 
namely, that with postwar Italy. The critical analysis of state ownership and the evolution 
of Italian corporate governance since World War II were presented in a paper by Barca & 
Trento (1997). They concluded that the full-scale or majority state ownership of corpora-
tions can be effective in separating ownership and control during stages of accelerated 
growth as well as when shifts in the sectoral balance are needed. However, this system is 
bound to degenerate over time in the absence of a functioning political market and when 
state-owned enterprises are burdened with “special social objectives.” 
These judgments can be timely in contemporary Russia because consolidation of 
the state and economic success in the early 2000s gave leading politicians and top officials 
a sort of euphoria about the role and capabilities of the state. This resulted in a further ex-
tension of the state’s presence in the economy, bringing a growing number of large com-
panies under direct or indirect control of the government and leading to the creation of gi-
ant, practically non-transparent state corporations. In our opinion, if these trends continue, 
they can change the character of the state’s influence on the behavior and performance of 
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